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·• 
THE ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT 
THE TAXONOMIC UNIT 
T. C. STEPHEXS 
The retiring president is expected to follow the custom of ad-
dressing the Academy upon some subject of general interest. 
Fortunately, custom does not require that such an address 
shall embody one's own research or investigation; but it may 
consist of a survey, or of reflections of a general nature. 
It so happens that certain fields in which I have been some-
what interested have brought me to a study of the problem of 
the taxonomic unit in biology. 
One difficulty which concerns many working biologists, and 
which seems to be becoming more and more acute, is the determi-
nation of the living forms upon which they work. 
Insofar as zoological and botanical work is to have a perma-
nent value in science it must at all times be open to verification; 
and it must at all times be possible to relate observations pre-
cisely to the natural forms upon which they were made. The 
necessity of stability in nomenclature is obvious to all. 
Our studies in nature have proceeded so far, and differentia-
tions are becoming so refined, that the problem of nomenclatural 
stability is becoming one of concern. In fact, there may be no 
such thing as stability; in which case the problem would be to 
build up a system that would cause the least amount of confusion 
in its operation. 
The "species question" is not new to you ; and to most of you 
who are concerned with the biological field, at least, the tenden-
cies are familiar. I have been loath to present to you a discussion 
of the species question, partly because of its venerable theme, 
and partly because it has received the attention of some of the 
most illustrious biologists, both of the past and of the present. 
In fact, I think it was Darwin who exclaimed "How painfully 
true it is that no one has the right to examine the question of 
species who has not minutely described many." With this warn-
ing a wiser soul might hesitate to proceed further. And yet, 
the subject is one that cannot be evaded, and is one which cannot 
be solved for us by the science of any previous period. 
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In its philosophical aspects the species question is of interest; 
but from that point of view there is no pressing need of solution. 
As a scientific problem, however, it affects our daily work, and 
may become a barrier to progress. 
Much has been said of the ideality versus the reality of the 
species concept. \Vhile the conception of a species may be purely 
a matter of the mind; and while there may still exist the debatable 
question as to whether the group or the individual is the real 
unit in nature; yet the fact remains that in practice we must have 
a unit. 
\Vhen we endeavor to trace the historical development of any 
general idea in science it is customary to look as far back, at 
least, as Aristotle for a starting point. But in this case we do not 
find that Aristotle possessed any clear and defined notion of what 
we now call species. He recognized, and had names for, the 
different kinds of animals and plants, of course; but these dif-
ferentiations were probably not based upon any generalized 
notions. 
The first definition of species is usually attributed to John Ray, 
the Englishman, who lived in the seventeenth century. The dom-
inant principle in Ray's conception was community of descent. 
As interpreted by Hertwig, Ray's definition of species was as 
follows: "For plants there is no other more certain character-
istic for determining species than their origin from the seeds of 
specifically or individually like parents; that is to say, generalized 
for all organisms, to one and the same species belong individuals 
which spring from similar ancestors." 
The next important contribution to the subject was made by 
Linnaeus, who said: "There are as many different species as 
there were different forms created in the beginning by the Infinite 
Being." ("Species tot sunt diversas formas ab initio creavit 
infinitum ens.") The problem in Linnaeus's time was to establish 
the reality of species and their immutability, rather than to ex-
amine critically the criteria by which they might be recognized. 
Buffon's definition was: "A constant succession of individuals 
similar to and capable of reproducing each other." DeCandolle 
defined a species as "an assemblage of af1 those individuals which 
resemble each other more than they do others, and which are 
able to reproduce their like, in such a manner that they may be 
supposed by analogy to have descended from a single being or a 
single pair." 
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Johannes :'.\J uller and De Quatrefages followed in the same line 
of thought. The former referred to a species as "a living form 
represented by individual being, which reappears in the product of 
generation with certain invariable characters, and is constantly 
reproduced by the generative act of similar individuals." While 
De Quatrefages defined species as "an assemblage of individuals 
more or less resembling one another, which are descended or may 
be regarded as being descended, from a single pair by an uninter-
rupted succession of families." In these earlier years the con-
ception of species was dominated by the principles of immutability 
and discontinuity. 
More recently there has been a tendency to emphasize the value 
of physiological functions in the diagnosis of species and varie-
ties. This seems to be an especially easy point of view for the 
student of bacteria and smaller fungi. The metabolic processes 
of the bacteria, for instance, seem to be more readily distin-
guished, if not more constant, than the structural peculiarities. 
And, of course, a very excellent case can be made out for the 
specificity of such physiological characters. It must be borne in 
mind, ho\vever, that back of every physiological process there 
must be a morphological organization which carries the same spe-
cific peculiarity. The same may be said of peculiar and charac-
teristic secretions, such as gums, oils, alkaloids, etc. 
During the early part of the preceding generation there was a 
trend away from the Linnaean conception of species. Thus, 
Huxley expressed his conception of species in this language: 
"\Vhen we call a group of animals, or of plants, a species, we may 
imply thereby, either that all these animals or plants have some 
common peculiarity of form or structure; or we may mean that 
they possess some common functional character." 
Haeckel says that the word species "serves as the common desig-
nation of all individual animals or plants which are equal in 
all essential matters of form, and are only distinguished by quite 
subordinate characters." 
In this latter group of definitions we will observe that the 
principle of structural similarity is dominant. Nothing can be 
more evident to the biologist, who is compelled to deal, even super-
ficially, with the nomenclature of organisms, than that fundamen-
tal concepts and terms are in marked process of change. Half 
a century ago Professor Owen remarked: "I apprehend that few 
naturalists nowadays, in describing and proposing a name for 
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what they call a 'new species,' use the term to signify what was 
meant by it twenty or thirty years ago." 1 It may be agreed that 
concepts must change with the development of knowledge, but 
it would seem that scientific terminology ought to remain as near 
constant as possible. 
After this rather brief historical survey of the species concept 
it will be germane to inquire as to what concrete criteria have been, 
or can be applied. The analysis shows that there are three such 
criteria, viz., the genetic, the physiological, and the morphological. 
The idea that hereditary descent is the essential test of specific 
rank seems to be the oldest and original point of view. As in-
timated, this was Ray's conception. This criterion is definite, 
but it fails in allowing for no expansion, no evolution. By virtue 
of continuity a species is always the same species. And this is 
manifestly in contradiction to the modern viewpoint. This cri-
terion furnishes the basis for the modern principle of intergrad-
ation. 
The criterion of relationship can have little value, because all 
forms and all groups, including subspecies, species, genera, etc., 
are related in this sense. So that relationship is a common prop-
erty, and not a differential character. Furthermore, in nature it 
is usually impossible to know the parentage of forms. 
The physiological test of species has had a long and honorable 
past. Many older writers were quite firmly convinced that true 
species could not interbreed. So that, interspecific sterility was 
accepted as a true test of a proper species. Time has shown, 
however, that it is not. 
There are recorded cases of sterility in hybrids; rhere are 
recorded cases where sterility results from a cross in one direction, 
and fertility results from a cross in the other direction; there are 
recorded cases where fertility results from a cross in both direc-
tions; and there are, apparently, a few cases in which the hybrid 
shows a greater degree of fertility than in normal fertilization. 
Such facts indicate, no doubt, that all species do not possess 
the same degree of difference, physiologically, at least. But they 
also show that there is no constancy in the matter of sterility in 
hybrid offspring, and that such a criterion cannot be used in the 
test of species. 
Aside from the matter of reproduction some functions have 
been regarded as having specific value; for example, in the pro-
1 "On the Osteology of the Chimpanzees and Orangs." Trans. Zoo!. Soc., 1858. 
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duction of certain secretions, such as gums, alkaloids, etc. Most 
especially, in the study of large groups of minute parasitic organ-
isms, like the bacteria and other fungi, the effects of their meta-
bolic activities upon living hosts or upon culture media not only 
are characteristic, but are quite easily discerned. The minute size 
of many of these organisms makes the application of the morpho-
logical test somewhat difficult. And while expediency may justify 
the use of physiological characters in such cases, this should not 
blind us in recognizing the inadequacy of this principle in general. 
We may now consider the morphological criterion, viz., that 
similarity of structure brings individuals within the limits of the 
specific group, regardless of ancestry - known or unknown. 
It goes without saying, almost, that we can have no other cri-
terion for extinct species, whuse only remains are structural. 
ln the examination: of structure we are able to measure and 
compare. All of the data are present. It remains but to fix the 
limits and bounds. Such a criterion of species harmonizes with 
the conception of a variable and mutable species. 
But when the species varies or mutates beyond the confines of 
the defined species it becomes something else, under our eyes, 
just as we assume others have done in the prehistoric past. For, 
in the words of L. H. Bailey, ''This notion that a species, to be 
a species, must have originated in nature's garden, and not in 
man's, has been left over to us from the last generation." 2 
The taxonomists of the present generation in science have not 
entirely graduated from the Linnaean conception of species, par-
ticularly as it includes the idea of fixity; although they are prone 
to look with disdain upon his meager binomial vocabulary. They 
mistake continuity for fixity and immutability. In their laudable 
efforts to harmonize classification with the probable phylogenetic 
history they forget that all groups above the individual are, in a 
measure, artificial and arbitrary, and of necessity must be, since 
we have no authentic record of their phylogenesis. 
Our conclusion is, then, that the only true and scientific cri-
terion of species is the one based upon morphology. 
To what extent may the differentiations of living organisms be 
useful to science? \Vhat degree of difference should be recog-
nized taxonomically? We may readily understand that where 
such living forms are under experimental observation for the 
purpose of determining genetic relationships, considerable care 
in cataloguing minute variations may be necessary; but where 
2 Survival of the Unlike, page 110. 
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individuals are taken at random in nature, the same thing is not 
true. 
It is interesting to learn that new forms in a single group 
(birds) are being recognized and named at the rate of about one 
thousand per decade in a single zoo-geographical region (Africa). 3 
Many of these newly described forms are, doubtless, subspecies. 
The subspecies is a modern refinement of the older unit, the 
species, with the drawback that it is far more difficult to handle, 
requiring a considerable amount of material and a degree of skill 
possessed only by the specialist. The subspecies unit is being 
introduced not only in Africa, but also in America., and not only 
among birds, but in other groups of vertebrates and invertebrates, 
and in many of the groups of plants. The question as to the 
serviceability of this modern unit is, then, germane. 
The subspecies lacks even the capacity for exact definement 
that is possessed by the Linnaean species. The only characteristic 
of subspecies is intergradation. The only avowed justification, 
on biological grounds, for recognizing and cataloguing subspecies 
is to provide for the possibility of detecting incipient species.4 
That it may be done on other grounds cannot be denied. 
But, in order to provide for the very probable possibility of 
discovering incipient species some taxonomists, and others, seem 
to be willing to submerge the whole nomenclatural system into 
confusion and chaos. Perhaps it may be said, without injustice, 
that at the present time there are certain groups of both animals 
and plants whose taxonomy and nomenclature have reached such 
a state of confusion in about a direct proportion to the atttntior. 
these groups have received from taxonomists - and this mostly 
a result of multiplication of subspecies. 
When a group has been pretty thoroughly worked over ior all 
the subspecies it will yield there will be nothing left for taxono· 
mists to do but to make further revisions with the admission of 
hypersubspecies to be designated in tetranomials, and so on.5 
3 The Auk (XXXVI, page 4j2) quotes The Journal fur Ornithologie (January, 
1918) as authority for the statement that 979 new forms of birds have been named 
for Africa during the years 1905 to 1914. 
4 A clear-cut discussion of this question is to be found in certain papers in recent 
numbers of the Journal of Mammalogy. Dr. C. H. Merriam attacks the principle of 
intergradation and defends the morphological test. (Volume I, No. 1, pp. 6-9, 1919.) 
Mr. P. A. Tave ner defends the principle of intergradation. (Volume I, No. 3, pp. 
124·127, 1920.) 
5 I am indebted to my colleague, Dr. A. W. Lindsey, for the following contem· 
poraneous entomological example of taxonomic excess: F. E. Watson (!ourn. N. Y. 
Ent. Soc., XXVIII, page 232, 192()) described and named the following aberrant 
form of an Hesperiid, viz., Poanes hobomok form 9 pocalzontas ab. friedlei. Poca· 
hontas is merely a melanic unisexual dimorphic form of hobomok, which varies 
considerably in the extent of its pale maculation. Friedlei is merely the darkest 
form of Pocahontas yet recorded, and its christening seems to carry the matter to an 
unnecessary and objectionable degree. And, worst of all, the single type specimen 
• 
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There is no logical reason for stopping short of this, and no law 
to prevent it. It would seem that the tendency here referred to 
is a result of a perverted specialization. One is led to wonder 
whether such a practice is designed to further the ends of science, 
or to furnish an occupation. 
The whole problem of the determination of specific rank has 
been in the tentative stage from the beginning, and there is some 
reason to suspect that it will always be a matter surrounded with 
difficulty and variance of opinion. What is to be gained, there-
fore, in attempting to establish another hypothetical unit below the 
species? 
There are two possible conceptions of specific variants. These 
variants may be regarded as due to fluctuating( continuous) var-
iations, and their relationship should be represented by some 
sort of a radiate pattern, thus: 
Or they may be due to orthogenetic variations, and should be 
represented in a linear system, thus : 
In the latter case, no matter where we assign the ancestral type 
in the system, it need not have direct continuity with all of the 
other forms. So that, if A, B, C, and D are named forms of 
subspecific rank, and if A is regarded as the prototype, then B 
may be a subspecies, but not so with C and D. C might be called 
a hypersubspecies. 
It might be supposed that D would differ from A to such an 
extent as to justify specific rank; but, according to a principle 
which has grown up in modern systematic zoology, so long as 
intergrading forms exist between A and D, the latter cannot be 
of friedlei was reared artificially, and under such environmental conditions as pro· 
duced also an unusually dark male; but the aberrantly dark male escaped a christen-
ing. To some this procedure will seem to be a prostitution of the purposes of taxon· 
omy and nomenclature. 
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assigned to specific rank. Thus, no matter how unlike A and 
D may become, the presumption of common origin, as evidenced 
by intergrades, prevents their recognition as distinct species. This 
principle (of intergradation) is untenable from a general biolog-
ical viewpoint because it is inconsistent with the doctrine of 
evolution. It is, in fact, a vestige of the discarded doctrine of 
immutability of species. How specific rank can be granted to 
L3inx canadensis and Lynx ruffus, for instance, and then denied 
to the extremes of variation in the Great Horned Owl, merely 
because of the existence of intergrades, is a puzzle which puts a 
strain on one's logical faculty. 
On the other hand, if the study of any group of subspecies or 
varieties would permit their arrangement into a radial system, 
the explanation would be in harmony with well-understood bio-
logical principles, and with the facts of continuous variability. 
This system requires a prototype, hypothetical or known, upon 
which the name may be bestowed. The radial variates, continu-
ous variations, are designated simply as varieties when it is nec-
essary to distinguish them at all. Theoretically discontinuous 
variations produce species at once, and leave no intergrades. 
I believe that ornithological taxonomists have found it usually 
impossible to determine prototypes among subspecies; and they 
have been satisfied merely to catalogue different forms which in-
dividual opinion may regard as having subspecific rank.6 
\Vhat is to be gained, of value, by naming continuous varia-
tions, or any particular assemblage of continuous variations, such 
as a variety or geographic race? \Vill, it not weaken an other-
wise fairly satisfactory system of nomenclature? It is quit~~ true 
that any one of them may represent an incipient species. And 
it is easily conceivable that any one may proceed in the devel-
opment of still further unlikeness from the form with which it 
may be most closely related. The incipiency of this sort of thing 
seems to be too small a matter to be provided for in a nomen-
clatural system. As Loomis says, "In trying to manufacture a 
nomenclature for birds of remote ages, past and future, are we 
not putting an impediment in the way of the study of existing 
birds?" 7 
6 It is true that a committee of the American Ornithologists' Union has acted as 
a court which accepts or rejects proposals of new forms of North American birds; 
for some years the rulings of this committee were satisfactory and generally accepted. 
More recently the committee has not, apparently, been functioning. It is assumed that 
the flood of "revis.ions," with a perplexing array of newly proposed subspecies, has 
laid upon this committee an impossible task. It seems, at least, that such must be 
the inevitable outcome of the application of the principles of intergradation, subspecies, 
and trinomial nomenclature. 
7 The Auk, XX, page 299, 1903. 
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Along with the subspecies unit comes trinomial nomenclature. 
The greatest objection to this lies, perhaps, in the difficulty in-
volved, and the consequent restriction in use. It will not help 
to say that subspecies and trinomials are for the use only of 
taxonomic experts, and that others may be co~tent with the 
species unit. There must be a common ground in order to pro-
mote cooperation and prevent misunderstanding and confusion. 
The taxonomist has no license for erecting a system which is un-
related to other biological fields. It must be emphasized that 
taxonomy and nomenclature are tools of the biologist, and not 
a branch of science sui generis; they serve no useful ends apart 
from their relation to other branches of biological knowledge. 
Thus the biologist has a right to discuss the manner in which 
taxonomy is helpful, or otherwise. 
Other objections which have been offered to the subspecies 
unit and trinomial nomenclature may be summarized as follows: 
(a) There is usually a variance in the judgment of the ex-
perts on the relative value of the min\lte characters upon which 
subspeciation is based. 
(b) Subspecies and trinomials represent no stopping place, but 
lead directly to tetranomials and polynomials. 
( c) Such ultra-refinement thwarts the purpose of any system 
by introducing uncertainty and lack of precision in the ends 
which taxonomy is designed to serve. For the sake of argument 
we might grant that the expert taxonomist might be able to 
work precisely even with subspecies, but we would immediately 
reply that that, in itself, would serve no useful end. ·when we 
split our subspecies one or more times we will be back to the 
good old pre-Linnaean days when, as pointed out by Loomis, 8 the 
Mockingbird was distinguished by the name of Turdus minor 
cinero-albus non-inaculatus. Yet this is simplicity in comparison 
with the multiplicity of trinomially designated forms which only 
a half dozen persons in the world, perhaps, are qualified to de-
termine. 
(cl) As urged by some of the British ornithologists when the 
trinomial system was proposed by the American school, perhaps 
the greatest objection is its liability to abuse. That such abuse 
has been practiced one example will suffice to show. In the 
recent pages of the leading American ornithological journal a new 
subspecies of teal duck was described, in which the differential 
character was the extension of a white crescentic patch from the 
s The Auk, XX, pp. 294-299, 1901. 
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front of the head around to the mid-occipital region, where the 
two white bands fused. 9 In the next issue of the same journal a 
writer reported that a duck of the same supposed subspecies, 
which had been kept in captivity in a public park, had molted a 
splendid example of the species.10 
Finally, and in summary, the preceding remarks may be inter-
preted as a protest against the substitution of the subspecies for 
the species as a taxonomic unit. It seems unnecessary to offer 
evidence that there is a strong tendency in this direction. 
Simple binomial nomenclature permits the designation of sub-
specific forms (i.e., varieties) where necessary in biological inves-
tigation, by the use of the term "variety" (usually abbreviated) 
followed by the varietal name. By this method no attempt is 
made to establish a new unit, and yet it provides a means of dis-
tinction where such is needed. By it incipient species may be 
recognized without jeopardizing the usefulness of the specific 
unit. In other words we would return to the status quo prior 
to the use of the trinomial.system. 
9 The Auk,. XXXVI, pp. 455-460, 1919. 
10 The Auk, XXXVII, pp. 126·127, 1920. 
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